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ABSTRACT
Monitoring large-scale networks for malicious activities is increasingly
challenging: the amount and heterogeneity of traffic hinder the manual definition of
IDS signatures and deep packet inspection. In this thesis, we propose MINOS, a novel
fully unsupervised approach that generates an anomaly score for each host allowing us
to classify with high accuracy each host as either infected (generating malicious
activities), attacked (under attack), or clean (without any infection). The generated
score of each hour is able to detect the time frame of being attacked for an infected or
attacked host without any prior knowledge. MINOS automatically creates a
personalized traffic behavioral model for each host and does not require any previous
knowledge of existing or unknown attacks. Experimental evaluation on a real large
academic network over one year of data shows that MINOS achieves very high
accuracy, even when analyzing only two weeks of data. We demonstrate MINOS is
also efficient and faster than a state-of-the-art approach for unsupervised anomaly
detection on traffic data.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1

Motivation

The Internet is a widespread system in continuous evolution, where the
number of attacks, Internet traffic, and line speed continues to grow [32]. Nowadays,
it is common to use an access speed of 1 - 10 Gbps. Since bandwidth for wired
connections is available, high-bandwidth services are being offered to users. For
example, a university network reaches traffic averages in the order of hundreds of
Mbps, including high activity peaks in the order of Gbps [53, 58, 59]. On backbone
networks, the throughput will even be higher. Also, it is conventional for Internet
users to have been a victim of an attack because of attackers’ constant assaults into
networked systems. For example, a hacked machine can send out sensitive data to an
unauthorized host; in this case, the cost of these attacks would be billions of U.S.
dollars [15]. Therefore, it becomes significant to detect and prevent these intrusions as
early as possible. Therefore, Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) need to
handle the rising number of attacks, the growth of Internet traffic as well as the
increase in line speed.
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The most popular systems such as Bro [46], SNORT 1, and Suricata 2
demonstrate high resource consumption, when confronted with the vast amount of data
found in today’s high-speed networks [14]. Additionally, those systems are doing an indepth analysis of the packets. If the packet’s data is encrypted, then it poses a new
challenge to payload-based systems. Moreover, researchers assess that the payloadbased NIDS processing capability lies between 100 Mbps and 200 Mbps [17, 34],
which is inconvenient to this era. In contrast, the flowbased NIDS looks at aggregated
information of related packets in the form of flow, so the amount of analyzing data is
reduced [1, 51, 53]. In this context, flow-based approaches might be a promising
candidate for Intrusion Detection research [59].
Traffic networks of large organizations are challenging to protect and monitor,
due to the increasing amount of communications and heterogeneity of user behaviors
and devices. Misuse-based systems (e.g., IDS [46]) require a priori knowledge on
attacks and standard definitions of signatures by security analysts. Therefore,
researchers focused on building statistical anomaly-based systems [9]. In this context,
proposed supervised models often train on traffic datasets that contain artifacts (e.g.,
DARPA datasets [37]). As a result, those models do not generalize well when
deployed in the real world. Moreover, obtaining reliable labels for traffic events is
challenging [56]. For these reasons, the focus of this thesis is an entirely unsupervised
setting (without any training labels).

An open-source network intrusion prevention and detection system, at <www.snort.org>
Suricata is a free and open-source, mature, fast and robust network threat detection engine, at
<https://suricata-ids.org/>
1

2
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Existing research on unsupervised traffic anomaly detection is affected by some
critical limitations: existing works either make strong assumptions to identify specific
threats (e.g., similar communication patterns for botnet identification [21]), or require
unencrypted traffic (e.g., [5, 36]). Other methods that work even in the presence of
encrypted traffic either assume specific threats (e.g., data exfiltration [39]) or do not
scale to large networks (e.g., IoT traffic of surveillance cameras [41]).
In this thesis, we propose MINOS 3, a fully unsupervised approach that produces
an anomaly score for each internal host of an organization. That anomaly score can
prioritize and classify (in an unsupervised manner) each host into one of three
categories: clean, under attack, and infected. Also, it can recognize the attack time of
an infected or under attack host. The inputs of MINOS are network communications
between the internal hosts of an organization and the Internet, where no ground truth
is required. To address the heterogeneity of network communications, MINOS
automatically creates a behavioral traffic profile for each host independently by
clustering network flows. We remark that MINOS is a fully unsupervised approach
followed by a parallel procedure over multiple hosts. We experimented MINOS over
1,000 hosts and one year of network traffic at Boise State University. We then
evaluated how the anomaly score of MINOS prioritizes and differentiates three classes
of hosts effectively. We also show that MINOS has better accuracy and execution time

In Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedy, MINOS is depicted as a man with a serpent tail in charge of judging
evil souls to determine which circle of Hell they deserve to be in. The circle is determined by the number
of wraps of MINOS’s tail on the evil soul.

3
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than Kitsune [41], a state of the art approach for unsupervised traffic anomaly
detection.
1.2

Contributions

In summary, this work makes the following main contributions:
•

We propose a novel fully unsupervised large-scale traffic

analysis approach, called MINOS, that is able to classify internal hosts into
one of three classes: clean, malicious, and under attack and also identify
the time frame of being attacked. This is different from most prior research
that distinguished just between benign and malicious activities. We
evaluate MINOS on one year of real data collected for 1,000 hosts of Boise
State University (a large academic network).
•

In addition to offline analysis of one year of traffic data, we

show that MINOS retains high performance in classifying hosts even when
applied on reduced time windows (e.g., two weeks).
•

We show that MINOS outperforms Kitsune [41] (a state-of-the-

art approach for unsupervised traffic anomaly detection) both in accuracy
and in execution times.
Our results show that MINOS is a viable solution towards identifying risky hosts in
large networks in the absence of label supervision.
1.3

Outlines

In Chapter 2, we provide the relevant background of Intrusion Detection
Systems, machine learning in supervised and unsupervised contexts, neural networks,
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commonly used standard novelty detection algorithms, and present the literature
review of previous research works related to this thesis.
In Chapter 3, we discuss the size and shape of the raw dataset, experimental
machine selection, network flows collection, and feature selection procedure. Also,
we present the problem statements of this thesis.
In Chapter 4, we describe the methodology and implementation of feature vector
extraction and novelty detection algorithms, i.e. identifying host status and time frame
of existing attacks.
In Chapter 5, we extend our discussion on the experimental setup, variants of
experimental instances and statistical relevance.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we discuss a summary of the proposed methodology, the
future research direction and conclude this thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This chapter introduces the relevant background on intrusion detection
systems, machine learning, neural networks, novelty detection procedure, some
related works in the literature and comparison of them with our hypotheses. For
more details about machine learning and neural networks, we recommend
readers to a book by Goodfellow et al. [20]. For novelty detection algorithms, a
survey paper by Pimentel et al. [48] is recommended.
2.1

Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

IDS is a process of monitoring and identifying computer and network
events to determine the evolution of any unusual incident, which is considered to
be an intrusion [1]. Generally, it detects undesired exploitation to the computer
system, both through the Internet and the Intranet.
For example, a thief is standing in front of an anonymous house, looking
around, investigating the surroundings, and then starts turning the knob of the
front door. Unfortunately, the door is locked, so he moves to a nearby window
and smoothly tries to open it. Unluckily, that is locked too. It demonstrates that
the house is safe. If the house is safe in this way, why do people install an alarm
in their home? Similarly, the common question for intrusion detection
researchers: why researchers bother detecting intrusions if they established
firewalls, patched operating systems, and checked passwords for soundness? The
most straightforward answer to this question is intrusions still happen.
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However, firewalls contradict with IDS in the sense that they cannot usually
search for anomalies or specific content patterns to the same degree as IDSs do.
Moreover, unlike firewalls, IDSs are automated because they do not depend on a
human decision. As such, people occasionally skip updating a firewall’s rule set
correctly as they sometimes forget to lock their window. Therefore, developing
an IDS becomes worthy of discovering and reacting for any computer attacks
[31].
2.2

Types of IDS

Figure 2.1 illustrates the taxonomy of IDS, which is reproduced from
[59]. Generally, IDS can be divided into two basic categories based on their
position in the network or audit source location:
• Host-based IDS (HIDS)
•

Network-based IDS (NIDS)

NIDS can be divided into two categories based on the source of data to be
analyzed in NIDS:
•

Packet-based NIDS

•

Flow-based NIDS

Also, depending on the detection model IDS can be classified into two categories:
•

Signature-based IDS (SIDS)

•

Anomaly-based IDS (AIDS)
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Figure 2.1
2.2.1

IDS Taxonomy

Host-based IDS (HIDS)
A HIDS is capable of monitoring a single machine and audit data

(resource usage and system logs) traced by the hosting operating system [1]. It
gives deep visibility of critical systems and refers to protect the environment by
detecting and responding to malicious or anomalous activities. However, HIDS
does not provide a complete picture of the security posture. HIDS log data needs
to correlate with other critical security data and the latest real-world threat
intelligence. In this context, HIDS seems like an agent that can monitor whether
internal or external, anything or anyone, have blockaded the system’s security
policy.
2.2.2

Network-based IDS (NIDS)
NIDS is used to monitor a network and analyze traffic to protect a system

from network-based threats. Generally, a NIDS reads all inbound packets and
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searches for any suspicious patterns. If it can identify any risks, the system can
take action by notifying administrators or blocking the source IP address from
accessing the network [1]. As our goal is to identify a machine’s status by
scrutinizing network flows solely, we do not consider HIDS for this research.
Comparison between HIDS and NIDS: In contrast to HIDS, NIDS has
some advantages. In NIDS, the deployment of a new host in the network does
not need extra effort to monitor the network activity. Also, NIDS is less
expensive because updating one component of NIDS is more comfortable than
many components of HIDS on hosts. A NIDS presents extensive research of a
corporate network via scans and probes. NIDS allows administrators to protect
non-computer devices, such as firewalls, print servers, VPN concentrators, and
routers. More importantly, NIDS gives us flexibility with multiple operating
systems, devices, and protection against bandwidth floods and Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks.
2.2.3

Signature-based IDS (SIDS)
SIDS, also referred to as “misused-based” or "rule-based", works similar to

antivirus software [1]. SIDS monitors packets in the Network and compares them
with pre-configured and pre-determined attack patterns known as signatures. If
there is a successful match with the current input, an alert is prompted. A wellknown tool of SIDS is Suricata (an open source IDS tool), which monitors
networks by matching each packet it observes against a set of rules. A rule
consists of the following:
•

The action: Determines what happens when the signature matches
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•

The header: Defines the protocol, IP addresses, ports and direction of the
rule

•

The rule: Some options, which explain the specifics of the rule
The following is the appearance of a static machine’s alert at Boise State

University, which has been produced by the set of rules of Suricata (See table 2.1):
"10/12/2017-22:35:01.319011 [**] [1:2009582:3] ET SCAN NMAP -sS
window 1024 [**] [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
TCP 150.255.174.211:61512 -> 132.178.137.210:873"
When an alert happens, it is essential to figure out what it means. Is it
severe, or relevant, or merely a false positive? To find out more about the alert
produced by Suricata, it is always a good idea to look at the category of the
alerts, classification message, and priority of the alert. The alert mentioned
above is in the category of "ET SCAN" rule, the classification message is
"Attempted Information Leak", and priority is "2". Hence, "ET" indicates the rule
came from the Emerging Threats project and "SCAN" indicates the purpose of the
rule is to match on some form of scanning.
2.2.4

Anomaly-based IDS (AIDS)
An anomaly-based or behavior-based IDS can detect both network and

computer intrusions by monitoring system activity and classifying it as either
normal or abnormal. The classification is based on heuristics or rules, instead of
patterns or signatures, and it attempts to detect any misuse or abnormal system
operation. Figure 2.2 depicts some necessary modules for the general
architecture of AIDS, such as parameterization, training, and detection. The
parameterization involves accumulating raw data from a monitored environment,
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the training stage tries to model the system using manual or automatic methods,
and the detection stage compares the system generated in the training stage with
the elected parameterized data portion. Threshold criteria will be chosen to
determine anomalous data [45]. Although different types of anomaly detection
techniques are available, machine learning-based anomaly detection has become
prominent. The overview of machine learning technique for AIDS is described
in section 2.3.
Comparison between SIDS and AIDS: The advantages of SIDS are: ease
of implementation, lightweight, low false-positive rates, and high true positive
rates. One disadvantage, however, is its inability to detect any unknown attacks
like AIDS.
2.2.5

Packet-based NIDS
In packet-based NIDS, all network packets that pass through a specific

observation point are captured without any loss of information. For this reason,
it is also known as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). Various observation points
(i.e.,
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Figure 2.2

Generic AIDS functional architecture

routers, switches, network monitors, and so on) are dedicated to capture
and analyze packets so that the resulting measurement data transfers to a remote
analysis system.
A packet has two fields: the header (contains information about the source,
destination, and others) and the payload (data). The packet-based NIDS scans
these fields and determines whether or not a packet holds an intrusion. From the
database, every single rule is checked against scanned incoming packets, as
shown in figure 2.3. However, SIDS mostly uses a packet-based process.
2.2.6

Flow-based NIDS
The flow-based technique is a reputable data source in applications like

network monitoring, traffic analysis, and security. Since flow data or network flow
characterizes this method, flow-based NIDS is also referred to as “Network
Behavior Analysis.”
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Figure 2.3

Packet-based NIDS

The definition of a flow can be "a set of IP packets passing through an
observation point in the network during a specific time interval, i.e., all packets
belonging to a particular flow have a set of common properties" [11]. Based on
IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) terminology [25], the common properties
can be included with packet header fields (flow keys), source and destination IP
addresses, source, and destination port numbers, protocol, and some meta
information:
(ipSrc, ipDst, portSrc, portDst, proto)
The preparation and exportation format of flows are defined by two
wellknown protocols: NetFlow and IPFIX. There are two components in a
NetFlow setup: an exporter and a collector. The flow exporter can be a probe, a
switch, or a router, which extracts the headers from each incoming packet
noticed on the monitored interface. An exporter is responsible for creating the
flow records from observed traffic and sending them over the network to the
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collector. The collector stores these flow records for further analysis and
prepares them suitable for NIDS (figure 2.4). We have utilized one year of
NetFlow data at Boise State University to develop an intrusion detection model
that can prioritize and classify a set of machines.

Figure 2.4

Flow-based NIDS

Comparison between Packet-based and Flow-based NIDS: The
packetbased NIDS cannot detect any unknown attack as it compares only the
predefined and known malicious signatures. Therefore, it is a highly
resourceintensive task, expensive on a high-speed network, and infeasible in
case of an encrypted payload. On the other hand, flow-based NIDS can handle
considerably lower amount of data because it considers only the packet’s header
field instead of its payload. For this reason, on a high-speed network, flow-based
intrusion detection is more scalable than any of the other approaches. Moreover,
flow exporters are widely deployable, meaning there is no need for additional
capturing devices, and is less privacy-sensitive.
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2.3

Machine Learning Technique (MLT)

MLT is a form of applied statistics, which emphasizes the use of
computers to learn complex mathematical functions. To be more specific: "A
computer program is said to learn from experience E concerning some class of
tasks T and performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as measured
by P, improves with experience E" [42].
One of the practical applications of MLT is to comply with next-generation
IDS, because it can build the required model automatically by depending on a
given training dataset, which can be expressed using a set of attributes (features)
and associated labels. The features can be of different types: categorical or
continuous [45], and they are responsible for the applicability of anomaly
detection technique. On the other hand, the labels associated with data instances
are usually in the form of binary values, i.e., normal and abnormal. The
favorability of this technique is linked to the availability of the essential training
data. MLT classifies into supervised and unsupervised anomaly detection
algorithms based on the nature of the dataset where they are originated and
learned.
2.3.1

Supervised Anomaly Detection
Supervised methods or classification methods require a labeled training

dataset containing both normal and abnormal samples to construct a predictive
model.
Each training example consists of the independent variable(s) defining
the input domain of data and the dependent variable(s) representing the target.
Given a set of N training examples of the form {(x1, y1), ...(xN, yN)} such that xi is
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the feature vector of the ith example and yi is its label. A supervised learning
algorithm can be formulated as authorizing a computer to learn a function f : X
→ y, where X represents the space of independent variables (input space), and y
is the space of dependent variables (output space).
Although supervised methods have a better detection rate than semi-supervised
and unsupervised approaches, some technical issues were obtained; they are not as
accurate as they are thought to be. For example, the deficit of a training dataset
hinders its ability to achieve correct labels and noises of the training set will cause
high false alarm rates. In the literature, the most common supervised algorithms are
Supervised Neural Networks, Support Vector Machines(SVM), k-Nearest Neighbors,
Bayesian Networks, and Decision Tree [45].
2.3.2

Unsupervised Anomaly Detection
Unlike supervised techniques, unsupervised anomaly detection

techniques do not need any training data. They depend on two underlying
assumptions, (1) most of the network connections are normal traffic, including a
very little abnormal traffic, and (2) malicious traffic is statistically variant
behavior from normal traffic. According to these assumptions, frequently
appearing data groups of similar instances are assumed to be normal traffic,
while infrequent examples are considered to be malicious. The most common
unsupervised algorithms are clustering, anomaly detection, and novelty detection
algorithms.
2.4

Novelty Detection

Novelty detection is a machine learning task for identifying new or
unknown data. Recognizing abnormal system behaviors with the normal state of
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a system is the goal of novelty detection [40]. The system learns a model of the
normal environment that does not have any malicious activities, and instead of
finding any faults, the novelty filter detects the anomaly score deviations from
this model. Although unique events occur infrequently, it can have significant
consequences to overall system operation [10].

Figure 2.5

Framework of novelty detection

Figure 2.5 represents a general framework design of novelty detection, a
combination of knowledge disciplines and application domains. Hence,
knowledge discipline refers to several mathematical and algorithmic concepts,
where application domains follow system expertise.
Input data in the novelty detection framework passes through several phases:
preprocessing (remove an artifact from the data), feature extraction (input signals
using a comparatively smaller volume), and construction of feature vectors
followed by normalization (component-wise normalization). Afterward, the
novelty detection method accepts the obtained feature vectors as input and delivers
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the information about the novelty as an output. Figure 2.6 illustrates the normal
and abnormal data in feature space.

Figure 2.6

Novelty within feature space

Novelty detection has extensive applications in fields involving large datasets
generated from critical systems. These include: cyber intrusion detection [18, 49,
64], terrorist activity, system breakdown, fraud detection [6, 16, 47, 61], data
leakage prevention [55], electronic IT security [23], healthcare informatics,
medical diagnostics, industrial monitoring and damage detection, image
processing, video surveillance, text mining, sensor networks [8, 48], and many
other specialized applications [19].
Also, novelty detection has been extensively applied to detect any new attack in
IDSs, which falls within the application of novelty detection algorithms. However,
identifying a machine attack status using the novelty detection algorithms in network
flow datasets is the primary goal of this research.
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Figure 2.7

Taxonomy of novelty detection methods

Taxonomy of novelty detection is presented in Figure 2.7. We have applied
K-means clustering to create the input feature vector for novelty detection
methods. Similarly, clustering-based novelty detection techniques: Gaussian
Mixture Model (GMM), One-class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM), and
reconstruction-based (neural networks, autoencoder) algorithms are used to
compute the anomaly score. Based on this anomaly score, we have identified the
attack status of each machine in the network.
2.4.1

K-means algorithm
Let X = xi, i = {1, ..., n} be the set of n-dimensional points to be clustered

into a set of K clusters, C = Ck,k = {1, ..., K}. A K-means algorithm decides a
partition in such a way that the squared error between the observed mean of a
cluster and the points in the cluster is minimized. Let µk be the mean of cluster
Ck. The squared error between µk and the points in cluster Ck is defined as:
J(Ck) = ∑xi∈Ck ||xi − µk||2
The goal of K-means is to minimize the sum of the squared error for K
clusters,
J
Minimizing this objective function is known as an NP-hard problem, even
for K = 2 [27]. Thus K-means, a greedy algorithm, only concentrates on a local
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minimum. Generally, K-means starts with a primary partition with K clusters
and selects patterns of clusters to reduce the squared error. Since the squared
error is always inversely proportional to the number of clusters K (with J(C) = 0
when K = n), it can be minimized only for a fixed number of clusters.
The K-means algorithm depends upon three user-specified parameters: the
number of clusters K (a critical parameter), cluster initialization, and distance
metric. No perfect mathematical criterion exists to choose a value of K, though
some heuristics are available. K-means algorithms run independently with the
distinct values of K, and builds the most meaningful partition in the domain.
However, due to the convergence to local minima, different initializations can
lead to inconsistent clustering. One approach for making the k-means method
more efficient is to run the algorithm for a given K along with multiple different
initial partitions and choosing the partition that refers to the smallest squared
error. Another approach is to apply a filtering procedure that uses a spatial
hierarchical dataset index while computing means, which also saves on costs. A
third approach, explores the micro-clustering idea, which first groups the nearby
objects into “microclusters” and then performs k-means clustering on the
microclusters [22, 35].
2.4.2

Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM)
GMM is a non-bayesian, parametric probability density-based model,

that uses fewer kernels than the number of patterns in the training set [40] to
estimate the frequency. GMM uses optimization algorithms: conjugate gradients
or reestimation techniques such as the Expectation-Maximization (EM)
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algorithm for fitting the training data. They are followed by maximizing the loglikelihood of the training data to choose the parameters of the model.
2.4.3

One Class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM)
The OC-SVM is an unsupervised learning method that is aware of only a

single class of data. It distinguishes between vectors which are referred to as
either in class (inside the trained distribution) or outliers (outside the
distribution) and it lies between the origin and the optimal separating
hyperplane. The output score of OC-SVM represents the distance from the data
point being tested to the optimal hyperplane. Whereas, positive scores denote
normal behavior (with higher values representing greater normality) and
negative values describe abnormal behavior (with lower scores representing
larger abnormality) [12].
Generally, for novelty detection, OC-SVM uses a kernel trick to construct a
hyperplane to separate the normal data from the original with maximum margin
in a feature space [52]. OC-SVM assumes that a few training data points fall into
some regions and drives the regions to be small in a feature space associated
with the kernel [13]. The kernel trick, complied by the OC-SVM, makes it
simpler to separate the normal data from the origin in a higher dimensional
feature space.
2.4.4

Autoencoder
An autoencoder is an artificial neural network, commonly used for

unsupervised novelty detection, based on the reconstruction error of the training
examples. An autoencoder is trained to copy its input to its output along with the
common purpose of nonlinear dimensionality reduction, which is the process of
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lessening the number of random variables under consideration. An autoencoder
has two architectural parts: encoder and decoder. The encoder function creates
either single or multiple hidden layers, that contain a code to describe the input,
whereas, the decoder produces a reconstruction of the input from the hidden
layer. Having a hidden layer smaller than the input layer is beneficial as an
autoencoder is forced to create a compressed representation of the data in the
hidden layer. This representation facilitates the classification, visualization,
communication, and storage of data [24].
However, the intuition of an autoencoder is to obtain a higher
reconstruction error for the novel or unknown data. Autoencoders are also
trained with only the known examples in training data. While the optimized
embeddings are learned using the training data, the reconstruction errors are
computed for both the known and novel data in the test datasets. Here, the
reconstruction error is proportional to the chances of the data point to be
unknown. Figure 2.8 shows a three layer autoencoder: an input layer (Layer 1),
one hidden layer (Layer 2), and an output layer (Layer 3), where the hidden layer
captures the
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Figure 2.8

Simple architecture of an autoencoder

embeddings of the input layer into lower-dimensional space. These embeddings
are used by the output layer to reconstruct the original data [50].
2.4.5

LSTM Autoencoder
Generally, humans do not start thinking from scratch in every second.

For example, readers understand each word based on their perception of the
previous words. They do not drop everything each time and start rethinking from
the beginning; their thoughts have persistence — the same procedure followed
by the recurrent neural network, which allows information to persist. The
Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) allows forward and backward connections
between neurons. Long short-term memory (LSTM) is an example of RNN
architecture that recognizes values over random intervals. Stored values are not
modified as learning proceeds.
Implementing an autoencoder for sequence data by using an Encoder-Decoder
LSTM architecture is called an LSTM Autoencoder. An encoder-decoder LSTM is
configured to read the given dataset of an input sequence, encode it, decode it, and
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then recreate it. The model’s ability to recreate the input sequence represents the
performance of the model. While the model obtains a desired level of performance
by recreating the sequence, the model may drop the decoder part, leaving only the
encoder model. Afterward, this model can be used to encode input sequences to a
fixed-length vector. The resulting vectors are not limited as a compressed
representation of the sequence or as an input to another supervised learning model,
and preferably it can be used in a diversity of applications.
2.5

Performance Metrics

Similar to other machine learning algorithms, it is crucial to evaluate the
performance of our novelty detection algorithms. Therefore, we calculated
novelty scores for the flows dataset of each machine, and then used these scores
and the ground-truth to compute the Area Under Receiver Operating
Characteristic (AUROC) and Average Precision (AP) scores. We have described
the ground truth collection procedure to evaluate our experimental result in
Chapter 3.
2.5.1

Area Under Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC)
AUROC score computes the discriminating ability of classifiers or

novelty detection algorithms to correctly classify a dataset into different
categories such as known category or novel category. In our approach, we can
understand how well the AUROC score distinguishes between good machines
with the machines under attack or malicious machines. The AUROC is a plot
with a false positive rate (incorrectly identifying as being anomalies) of a
discriminating model as the x-axis and a true positive rate (correctly identifying
as being anomalies) in the y-axis.
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2.5.2

Average Precision (AP)
AP is more commonly averaged over all queries and reported as a single

score, which characterizes as a prominent performance measure in the novelty
detection domain. AP score reports the ability of novelty detection algorithms to
distinguish different objects as novel. In real work scenarios, it is common to
have a tiny proportion of new samples compared to the ordinary case. Therefore,
our goal is to prove the novelty detection algorithms are suitable to discriminate
the relatively small population of new examples. Hence, the false-negative rate
is pretty dangerous for discriminating models like novelty detection.

2.6

Suricata Rule Category

We considered one-year of traffic flow and collected recorded alerts from
a Suricata log file as the ground truth for this research. Suricata is an opensource, free, mature, fast, and robust network threat detection engine. It is
capable of real-time IDS, inline intrusion prevention (IPS), network security
monitoring (NSM), and offline pcap processing. The network traffic using
powerful and extensive rules and signature language and has powerful Lua
scripting support for the detection of complex threats. Most importantly,
Suricata’s fast-paced, community-driven development focuses on security,
usability, and efficiency.
We did not use ground truth for the input of our experiment, but we did use
it to evaluate our experimental results. Regarding static machines, we found
several alerts based on the ruleset of Suricata. Table 2.1 clearly describes the rule
set category at Boise State University, which has been producing various alerts.
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Based on some rules, Suricata can produce false positives. In that case, humans
need to start with only a few rules and work their way up. Otherwise, it just gets
overwhelming. On the other hand, if humans failed to set an important attack
detection rule, there is a high chance to have a false negative. In this context,
Suricata depends on personal decision or rule set-up. In this research, we found a
total of 25 rule sets into the Suricata log file at Boise State University, which
were decided by the security analyst at Boise State University. However, for this
research, we do not need to know which alerts are being produced by Suricata.
Instead, we only need the classification of machines in the network.
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Table 2.1

Description of rule set of Suricata

#

Rule Category

Description

1

SCAN

Early warning can detect and identify host and network
vulnerabilities in our environment. Scans can perform
external attack simulations and comprehensive
vulnerability checks along with registry evaluation.

2

POLICY

Application Identification category, which includes
signatures for applications like DropBox, Google Apps,
among others and also covers off port protocols. This
alert is saying "I saw unencrypted HTTP traffic
traveling over a port generally reserved for
HTTPS encrypted traffic".

3

DOS

A cyber-attack in which a legitimate user is unable to
access information systems, devices, or other network
resources because of the actions of a malicious cyber
threat actor.

4

COMPROMISED

A collection of known compromised machines,
confirmed and regularly updated. This list waved from
a hundred to several hundred rules based on the data
sources. Most importantly, Snort does not handle IP
matches well load-wise. Therefore, if your sensor has
already pushed to the limits, this set would add a
significant load.

5

CINS

Collective Intelligence Network Security (CINS) is a
network of "sentinel" machines running around the
internet, which allow a company to monitor those
attacks leveraged against them and score them
appropriately.

6

DROP

An IP based attack for some rules to block Spamhaus
“drop” listed networks and daily updated collection of
the Spamhaus DROP (Do not Route or Peer) list.
Primarily it is known as professional spammers.

7

INFO

General rules to track suspicious host network traffic.
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8

TOR

An IP based rules for the identification of traffic from
and to TOR exit nodes.

9

P2P

Rules for the identification of Peer-to-Peer traffic and
attack against, including torrents, edonkey, Bittorent,
etc.

10

DNS

Rules for attacks and vulnerabilities for DNS besides
the category for abuse of the service such as tunneling.

11

SNMP

Rules for attacks and vulnerabilities regarding the
Simple Network Management Protocol.

12

WEB-SERVER

Rules for attacks and vulnerabilities against web
servers.

13

MALWARE

Related to Malware and Spyware, where there is no
clear criminal intent present. The threshold for
formation in this set is typically some form of tracking,
which stops short of apparent criminal activity.

14

EXPLOIT

Rules to detect direct exploits such as Windows exploit, veritas, etc.

15

GAMES

Rules for the identification of gaming traffic and
attacks against games.

16

CHAT

Identification of traffic-related to various chat clients,
irc and possible check-in activity.

17

USER-AGENT

Rules for identification and detection of user agent.

18

VOIP

Rules for attacks and vulnerabilities against the VOIP
environment.
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19

TFTP

Rules for attacks and vulnerabilities regarding the
TFTP service.

20

FTP

Rules for attacks and vulnerabilities regarding the FTP
service.

21

SCADA

Rules for the signatures of SCADA attacks, exploits
and vulnerabilities.

22

MOBILE-

Rules for the specification of mobile platforms such as
malware and spyware related.

MALWARE
23

CURRENTEVENTS

Rules for active and short-lived campaigns, which
covers exploit kits and malware that will be aged and
removed instantly due to the temporary nature of the
threat.
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SHELLCODE

Dedicated to Remote Shellcode detection. Remote
Shellcode is used while an intruder wants to target a
vulnerable process that is running on a different
machine on a local network or intranet. After successful
execution, the shellcode grants the attacker access to
the target machine across the system.
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TROJAN

Highly significant ruleset that can detect malicious
software, which has an apparent criminal purpose.
Rules discover malicious software that is in transit,
active, infecting, attacking, updating, and whatever else
Suricata can identify on the wire.

2.7

Related Work

There are two significant approaches to detect malicious activities in
network traffic: misuse-based and anomaly-based. Misuse-based systems rely on
manually defined signatures which embed expert knowledge of a priori known
attacks. Such systems are commonly deployed in large enterprises through NIDS

30
that perform online DPI on traffic to detect whether a packet (or a set of packets)
matches one of the detection signatures. Some examples of NIDS are Snort,
Suricata, and Bro [46]. However, such systems do not scale well with the
increasing number of activities and attacks in network traffic as the signatures
require manual definition, and most importantly they are limited by requiring a
priori knowledge of the attack scenarios [56].
Anomaly-based systems create behavioral models of traffic towards the
goal of detecting malicious activities within a network, even in the absence of
prior knowledge about attacks [9]. Hence, many research efforts have been
focused on anomaly-based methods, but many challenges complicate the
application of statistical methods to traffic more than other domains [56] (see
also Section 3.7 in Chapter 3). Some existing approaches [7, 18, 29, 54] require
labeled traffic datasets (which are hard to obtain and limit the efficacy of the
approach to a priori attacks) or have too high computational times (which
hinders applicability of both offline and online analysis of traffic). On the other
hand, we propose a fully unsupervised approach that does not require any label,
and our approach is highly efficient, requiring less than 2 minutes to process a
half month of network traffic activities for 1,000 machines. Authors of [63]
propose an OC-SVM based method trained on malicious traffic; however, their
approach is supervised as it requires traffic labeled as malicious and does not
generalize to unseen malicious traffic. On the other hand, we aim to create a
behavioral model for every machine and identify which machines are more
anomalous.
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Deep Learning (DL) or ANN has been used extensively in the anomaly
detection process, because of its capability to learn complex concepts and the
concepts from the domain of network communication. There have been also
many efforts in applying DL [7] , ANNs [43, 44, 60, 66] and AutoEncoders [28,
65] for traffic anomaly detection. However, such models are supervised and
require periodic re-training, which is infeasible in modern high-speed networks
and at the rate to which new attacks are appearing [56]. In contrast, MINOS can
identify malicious, under attack and clean machines as well as the time frame of
being attacked for a machine in an unsupervised way by lightweight analysis of
network traffic flows.
The most recent and related work to our research is Kitsune [41], an
unsupervised approach for online traffic anomaly detection. Kitsune relies on an
ensemble of Autoencoders and takes as input packet-based features. Kitsune was
designed for online analysis and has been evaluated on about two hours of traffic
of IoT cameras, showing good results in detecting IoT botnet activities. We
argue that two hours of traffic are reasonable to create a behavioral model of an
IoT device, but it would not be enough to model client and server hosts of large
organizations, where patterns are highly variable and may follow weekly and
monthly patterns. Hence, by design, MINOS aims to create a behavioral model
over more extended periods and uses NetFlow information using packet-based
analysis that would be computationally infeasible to process for more extended
periods. Nevertheless, as described in more detail in Chapter 5, we also try to
adapt the AutoEncoder architecture used in Kitsune to our scenario, and we
experimentally demonstrate that MINOS performs better than Kitsune both in
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terms of detection capability and execution time. Moreover, unlike Kitsune,
MINOS can distinguish hosts into three classes, offering more intelligence to
security operators, which also allows hosts that are not yet infected but under
attack to take proactive steps.
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CHAPTER 3: DATASET AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this chapter, we provide a short overview of the dataset for MINOS: raw
dataset collection, preprocessing, experimental static machines selection, and
identification of useful features. We also describe research challenges and the
problem statement of this thesis.
3.1

Category of Data Sources

A few data sources have been utilized in NIDS, which do have the following
properties [53]:
•

Scalability: The capability of dealing with gigabyte networks

•

Lightweight: Small size of obtained network data

•

Privacy: Owing to the severe consequence of network data
monitoring

Network data sources can be extensively characterized by the following
categories:
•

The protocol-based data sources: Protocol-based datasets
comprises of Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP).

•

The packet-based data sources: In the packet-based approach,
whole network packets have been used, and recognition is usually
performed by the use of software such as tcpdump.

•

The flow-based data sources: The flow-based approach is
characterized by the use of network flows. According to literature,
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the flow is a unidirectional data stream between two machines where
all transmitted packets of this stream share some common
characteristics (source and destination IP addresses, source and
destination port numbers, and protocol) [1, 59].
For the time being, a unique measurement system can provide some extra
features with the general features of flow: the number of packets and bytes, the
start and end time, the timestamp of first seen, and a TCP flag. NetFlow and IPFIX
are two conventional protocols that define the preparation and exportation form of
flows [25], which is known as flow record. We explained in figure 2.4 in chapter 2,
how NetFlow exports flow in our network and makes it suitable for NIDSs for
further analysis.
It is convenient for NetFlow to deploy network communications because
almost all Cisco devices support at least one version of NetFlow. A file transfer
that involved transferring gigabytes of data in high-speed networks characterizes as
a comparatively small network flow. This flow builds up only a portion of the
original file transfer such that the overhead caused by creating flow records is
justified (the cost on account of NetFlow is in average 0.2 % [59]).
However, sampling techniques or flow aggregations can improve the
performance of routers and monitoring stations [57].
3.2

Size of the Dataset

The dataset was obtained from the university network after monitoring their
IDS’s setup, which is used to track inbound/outbound traffic for specific segments.
There was a 10-Gbps optical internet connection with a peak of 4.2 Gbps. They
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collected flows using Netflow version 5. This version extracts flow in the
following ways:
•

Internet: Inside the interface of the border firewall, which is
responsible for providing the outbound or uploaded traffic.

•

Internetout: Outside the interface of the border firewall, which is
responsible for providing the inbound or downloaded traffic.

In 5 minute intervals, nfdump has produced 2400 to 10,500 flows per second.
We selected 4th February 2017 to 4th February 2018 flow set for our research
purpose. The total size of this unzipped data set is 6.5 TB along with 57.87 Billions
of flows. We have parsed this massive dataset and chosen a partial amount of flows
for this research.
3.3

MINOS Overview and Dataset

For the dataset collection, instead of using traffic benchmarks which have
been shown to contain artifacts [37], we collected one year of real traffic for 1,000
LAN hosts at Boise State University 4. To deal with the number of communications,
we decided to use network flows (NetFlows) [39], which collect highlevel
communications between any two hosts. NetFlow allows MINOS to be resilient to
encrypted and obfuscated communications as no payload information is used.
MINOS operates in the following way. It takes as input network flows from a
large organization, which can correspond to multiple hosts, and analyzes them in a
fully unsupervised way (i.e., without any expert knowledge nor ground truth given

Unfortunately, obtaining access to a real enterprise network traffic is almost impossible due to
privacy concerns.
4
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as input). Instead of labeling individual events, MINOS aims to classify the state of
each host in the network as either:
•

Clean Host (CH): A host not involved in any malicious activity.

•

Host Under Attack (HUA): A host that is receiving attacks from
the outside.

•

Malicious Host (MH): An infected host that is performing an attack
to the Internet from the internal network of the organization.

We point out that this novel separation into three classes is different from prior
literature, in which only two classes of hosts were considered: malicious and
benign [5, 39, 41]. To deal with the heterogeneity of activities among different
hosts, MINOS automatically creates a personalized behavioral traffic profile for
each host independently. Afterward, novelty detection is applied to obtain an
anomaly score; the scores of all hosts are used as input for an unsupervised
classification module that has associated one of the three classes to each host.
Table 3.1
Dataset details. It corresponds to one year of traffic collected at
Boise State University (Feb 4th, 2017—Feb 4th, 2018).
Category

Num. Hosts

Num. Flows

Size(GB)

Clean Host (CH)

530

34,413,822

1.69

Host Under Attack
(HUA)

437

35,022,898

1.7

Malicious Host (MH)

33

4,146,507

0.21

Total

1,000

73,583,227

3.6

A detailed breakdown of the dataset considered in this thesis is reported in
Table 3.1. All 1,000 hosts are LAN hosts where the IP is assigned statistically. It is
essential that the mapping between user and host be static so that MINOS can
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create a behavioral profile over time. As ground truth for evaluating our method,
we have deployed a Suricata IDS and used the following criteria: a host hi is clean
if hi does not generate any alert, it is under attack if hi is in the destination IP of
identified alerts (but hi is never the source), and it is malicious if there is at least
one alert in which hi is the source of at least one alert. The Suricata configuration
has been optimized for the environment by security analysts. Suricata alerts
correspond to malicious activities such as botnet communications, command, and
control interactions, exfiltration or exploit attempts malware drive-by downloads,
and interactions with blacklisted external hosts [46].
The uniform selection procedure of 1,000 hosts has been described in section
3.5. After machine selection, we aggregated all the flows associated with those
machines from the whole dataset of a one-year duration. Ultimately, the size of the
dataset of 1000 devices is 3.6 GB of 73,583,227 traffic flows. Seen on Table 3.1,
HUA consists of the maximum number of flows compared with others, which is
almost 48 percent (1.7 GB) of the entire traffic (3.6 GB).
TABLE 3.2: Flows breakdown based on protocol
Protocol

Number of Flows

UDP

5,840,211

ESP

1

TCP

59,513,927

GRE

413,192

IPv6

7,091

SCTP

68

ICMP

7,808,741
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Total

73,583,227

There are a total of seven IP protocols that exist in our dataset: User Datagram
Protocol (UDP), Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP), Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE), Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6), Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), and Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP). Table 3.2 illustrates the maximum number of flows is
related to TCP protocol (80.88 % of the entire traffic).
Although we define ground-truth based on a signature-based system, MINOS
operates in a fully unsupervised fashion and uses minimal information of the net
flows. Moreover, it does not perform any deep packet inspection, works in the
presence of encrypted communications and obfuscated payloads. Also, MINOS can
operate in such a way in which signature-based systems would not work and does
not rely on any expert knowledge.
3.4

Feature Selection

In our dataset, a flow closely follows the Netflow version 5 and has the
following form:
(Date, Fseen, Dton, Prot, Isrc, Idst, Psrc, Pdst, Pckt, Bte, Flag)
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Table 3.3

Flow-based Features extracted from each flow.

#

Feature

Description

1

Weekend/Weekdays
(Date)

It is 1 if the flow started in the weekend and
0 otherwise.

2

First Seen (Fseen)

Timestamp of the beginning of the flow.

3

Duration (Dton)

Duration of flow in milliseconds.

4

Protocol (Prot)

TCP/IP Protocol of the flow.

5

Source Port (Psrc)

Source port of the flow.

6

Destination

Destination port of the flow.

Port

(Pdst)
7

Packet (Pckt)

Number of network packets transferred in
the flow.

8

Bytes (Bte)

Number of bytes transferred in the flow.

9

Incoming/Outgoing
(Flag)

It is 1 if the traffic flow is originated from a
host internal to the network and is going to a
host external to the network (outgoing). It is
0 if the traffic is generated from an external
host and is going to an internal host
(incoming).

The unidirectional communication is identified by the source and destination
IP addresses (Isrc and Idst), the operated ports (Psrc and Pdst), and the protocol type
(Prot). The fields Pckt and Bte give the total number of transmitted packets and bytes
respectively. The TCP header flags are stored as a binary "OR" in all packets of the
flow (Flag). We selected eight out of these eleven features for our experiment.
Hence, IP addresses are removed because they have been anonymized, and instead
of a TCP flag, we used a flag that maintains incoming or outgoing flow direction.
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Table 3.3 shows all the elected features of our experiment, including symbol and
description.
After finalizing features, it is necessary to complete the preparation of the
dataset by eradicating the categorical data. Hence, categorical data are variables
that contain label values rather than numeric values. For example, the protocol of
the input dataset is the string value. Some machine learning algorithms can support
categorical data directly. For example, a Decision Tree algorithm can learn directly
from categorical data where no data transforming is required. On the other hand,
many machine learning algorithms demand all numeric input and output variables,
instead of any label data.
Table 3.4

Minimum and maximum values of data set features
#

Feature

Minimum Value

Maximum Value

1

Date

0

1

2

Fseen

0

86,399,998.0
(millisecond
s)

3

Dton

0

312.5 (seconds)

4

Prot

1

7

5

Psrc

0

65,535

6

Pdst

0

65,535

7

Pckt

0

977,002

8

Bte

0

937,800,000

9

Flag

0

1

Therefore, we converted the time stamp of the first seen (Fseen) attribute to
milliseconds, changed the date (Date) to binary one or zero, based on weekends and
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weekdays, respectively. Protocol, Source Port, Destination Port are categorical
features which we converted to numerical through one-hot encoding with sparse
representation. Afterward, we considered the maximum and minimum value of all
features to get an idea about the deviation of those attributes (table 3.4). Since
seven types of the protocol (table 3.2) exist in our dataset, the minimum and
maximum value are one and seven respectively due to the label encoder. As a
preprocessing operation, each flow feature is normalized across all the flows, so
that the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1.
3.5

Figure 3.1

Machine Selection

Number of machines vs. average number of alerts
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Figure 3.2

Number of machines vs. large number of alerts

At first, we collected all the static machine’s list from network flow, and there
were a total of 16,290, whereas 1,000 static machines have been targeted to do
research. To select 1,000 machines in those three categories, we followed a
procedure to create a balanced machine set. We selected 47% of 1000 = 470 as
malicious or under attack machines, and 53% of 1000 = 530 as clean machines.
Among 470 machines, 33 were malicious machines, and 437 were under attack
machines. Between malicious and under attack machines, we picked 10% of 470 =
47 machines that contains a large number of alerts (48,000 — 8,661,605), and the
rest of the 423 (470-47) machines have an average number of alerts (2600 —
3100). Figure 3.2 and 3.1 portrays this machine selection procedure. Hence, the
number of flows were also in our consideration when we selected machines. Figure
3.4 and 3.3 represents these histograms. In synopsis, we selected 47 machines,
where the number of flows lies between 200,000 and 375,000, and alerts 48,000 to
8,661,605, and the rest of the machines (423) flows in the range of 58,000 to
68,000 and the number of alerts are from 2600 to 3100. On the other hand, similar
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to malicious machines, those machines (530) have been selected as CH, whose
number of flows lie between 58,000 and 68,000. Figure 3.5 represents this through
a histogram. The reason behind this selection procedure is to assure that our
experiment result is not biased with the number of flows.
3.6

Ground Truth Extraction

In the machine learning domain, the term "ground truth" indicates the
accuracy of the training set’s classification. In other words, we can say this term is
checking the results of a machine learning algorithm for precision against the real
world. This term is borrowed from meteorology, where "ground truth" refers to

Figure 3.3

Number of Machines with average number of flows
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Figure 3.4

Number of Machines with large number of flows

information obtained on-site. Usually, the term implies a kind of reality check for
machine learning algorithms and is used in statistical models concerned with
proving or disproving research hypotheses.

Figure 3.5

Number of Clean Machines with flows
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Table 3.5

Ground Truth for a single machine
Timestamp for one hour

Number

of

alerts
02/04/2017/00:00:00.000000-

0

02/04/2017/00:59:59.000000
02/04/2017/01:00:00.000000-

0

02/04/2017/01:59:59.000000
02/04/2017/02:00:00.000000-

5

02/04/2017/02:59:59.000000
02/04/2017/03:00:00.000000-

0

02/04/2017/03:59:59.000000

…

…
02/04/2018/01:00:00.000000-

10

02/04/2018/01:59:59.000000
We described three types of machines: CH, HUA, and MH and selected the
type of machine based on the ground truth. MINOS is a fully unsupervised
approach, and it does not need any labeling or prior knowledge. However, we
collected ground truth from the log files of Suricata in order to evaluate our results.
The Suricata log files from 4thFebruary, 2017 to 4thFebruary, 2018 were in our
consideration as an input dataset belonging to this range. The following is the
example of a single alert from the Suricata log file:
"10/12/2017-22:35:01.319011 [**] [1:2009582:3] ET SCAN NMAP -sS window
1024 [**] [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2] TCP
150.255.174.211:61512 -> 132.178.137.210:873"
Into this alert the string ”− > ” divides two IP addresses and port numbers.
The left side of that arrow (150.255.174.211:61512) indicates as source IP
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(150.255.174.211) and source port number (61512). The right side of that arrow
(132.178.137.210:873) means destination IP (132.178.137.210) and destination
port number (873).
Let’s assume, "132.178.137.210" is a machine that is under attack, which exists
in the alert as a destination IP address. There is also the exist date (10/12/2017) and
the timestamp (22:35:01.319011) of that alert. We created a dictionary to collect the
ground truth against a single machine. The key value of this dictionary is a particular
hour against a specific date, and the value is the number of alerts that exist in that
specific hour. Table 3.5 illustrated a sample of an identical machine’s ground truth,
where the first, second, and fourth hour of 4thFebruary 2017 do not contain any alerts,
whereas, in the third and last hour it holds five and ten alerts, respectively.
The problem with Suricata is that it is unable to detect any unknown attacks
because it is a signature-based or rule-based anomaly detection approach.
Moreover, it is analyzing packets to produce alerts against an attack, which is
inconvenient for today’s high-speed networks. Also, it is infeasible for encrypted
packets. Therefore, we proposed a novelty detection approach using only traffic
flows instead of packets so that it is able to detect any attacks from encrypted
traffic.
3.7

Research Challenges

Misuse-based systems rely on manually defined pattern matching signatures
(e.g., NIDS [46]). It cannot cope with the continuously evolving and growing
variety of traffic activities and attacks in large networks [62]. Moreover, these
methods require a priori knowledge of the attacks. Hence, statistical anomalybased
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methods have been investigated, but their adoption is hindered by several
challenges [56].
Dataset Collection. The first intrinsic challenge is to obtain a representative
dataset to evaluate a proposed method. Prior research efforts exist to build
benchmark datasets for traffic anomaly detection (e.g., DARPA [33], KDDCUP
[30]), but successive research [37] has demonstrated that such datasets contain
artifacts associated with the artificial injection of attacks, or that they are not
representative of the traffic of large real-world organizations.
Quantity of Communications. We focus on large organizations, which can
have thousands of hosts and billions of Internet communications per day. In such a
scenario, it is incredibly challenging to detect which specific actions are malicious.
Also it is challenging in terms of computational perspective. We will show how an
existing state-of-the-art approach for traffic anomaly detection becomes unusable
when applied in our domain.
Encrypted Communications. Some traffic anomaly detection methods
assume that the traffic is not encrypted [5, 36, 62]. It is important to develop a
methodology that can work in the presence of encrypted traffic and by using
minimal information about the communications so that it captures high-level
behaviors [39].
High Cost of Errors. Both false positives and false negatives have a much
higher cost than in other domains. False positives correspond to false alarms and
can quickly overwhelm security analysts if they have to investigate reported
incidents [56] manually. False negatives correspond to missed attacks—if even a
single host gets silently infected, then the whole organization is at risk. To
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complicate the situation, the majority of network activities are benign. Hence, due
to base rate fallacy [3], it is even harder to detect real network threats. Therefore, it
is crucial to achieving very high performance in this domain.
Heterogeneity of Activities. Each host has very different individual behavior.
An enterprise can have a Web server, file server, database servers, WiFi and LAN
clients, where employees can have a wide range of possible usage profiles [2, 39].
This varies greatly depending on the applications deployed on each host.
3.8

Problem Statements

We have designed MINOS taking these challenges into account. The
objective of this research is two-fold. Firstly, we propose MINOS is a novel
approach for fully unsupervised large-scale traffic analysis, are can prioritize and
classify internal hosts into one of three classes: clean, malicious, and under attack.
The goal is to find out the anomaly score of each machine and prioritize a group of
machines in a completely unsupervised way by analyzing only net flows. If that
machine is harmful, then identifying that machine as a malicious or under an attack
machine. In this thesis, the unique features of the novelty detection technique
makes it feasible to identify the state of the machine with high accuracy and less
execution time. Secondly, we figure out when the attack has happened for a
machine if the machine is under an attack or malicious.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY
Methodology
The MINOS approach consists of the following steps (Figure 4.1):
1. Collection of the sequence TFi of traffic flows during a particular time
frame (2 weeks to 12 months) for a specific host hi 5
2. Extraction of hourly-based features dataset by using the traffic flows of
host hi. The hourly-based features dataset consists of rows with
features [f1, . . . , fm], the flows starting in each specific hour of the
defined time frame (in Figure 4.1 the time frame contains d hours) for
the host hi.
3. Learning an anomaly hourly-based model from the hourly-based
features dataset and retrieving the anomaly score score(hourj) for each
hour hourj.
4. Normalization of all hourly scores and aggregation to achieve a unique
and absolute score for each host hi.
5. Given all the absolute anomaly scores for all the hosts, group the
scores in three categories and classify (in an unsupervised way) each
host in one of the three classes: CH, HUA, and MH.

We observe that such time frame lengths are required to create a realistic behavioral model of a
client/server host that may perform different operations depending on the time of the day, day of
the week, and month of the year [39].

5
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Figure 4.1

The main steps of MINOS.

6. Identifying each hour as anomalous or not based on the anomaly score.
We use the aggregated anomaly score for each host to prioritize the
dangerous machines and classify them in three categories (described in section 3.5
in Chapter 3): Clean Host (CH), Host Under Attack (HUA), and Malicious Host
(MH). It is essential to notice that the MINOS procedure is fully unsupervised
since it uses only traffic flow data as input. Moreover, the MINOS procedure is
parallelizable for each host, depicted in Figure 4.1), where MINOS can quickly
scale to analyze a large number of hosts. In the remainder of this chapter, we
describe in details steps 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of MINOS.
4.1

Step 2: Hourly-based Feature Extraction

In this step, for each host, MINOS first extracts features for each flow
(flow-based features), then processes them to obtain the hourly-based features.
These hourlybased features summarize the behavior of the host across all hours of
the specific time frame. The hourly-based features are the ones required to
compute the anomaly score (Figure 4.1).
The hourly-based feature extraction step (Figure 4.2) takes an input of all the
traffic flows within a specific time frame; then, it produces a set of features for
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each hour. Each flow Flowj is characterized by a timestamp tj and a vector of flow
features Gi. The features extracted from each flow are described in Table 3.3.
After computing Gi, we execute the K-Means clustering algorithms to obtain
{C1, . . . , Ck} clusters. It is important to note that the First Seen feature (Table 3.3)
is used to create clusters containing flows that are temporally close to each other.
Protocol, Source Port, and Destination Port are categorical features which we
convert to numerical through one-hot encoding with sparse representation. As a
preprocessing operation, each flow feature is normalized across all the flows, so
that the mean is 0, and the standard deviation is 1.
We used a machine-learning algorithm, K − means to train a model for our
input dataset. The motivation for choosing K-Means is that the number of flows
for each host is large, and the K-Means clustering is the fastest clustering
algorithm in terms of Euclidean space and similarity. The critical part is selecting
the number of clusters because each machine contains a different quantity of
flows. Hence, the static value of this parameter can be a hindrance for our desired
outcome. For example, machine A has 58, 000 flows, and machine B has 5 million
flows; if the static value of the cluster number is 50, it might be precise for
machine A but not for machine B. Thus, we used the well-known rule of thumb
[26] on choosing the best k for a K − Means clustering: k

, where g is the

number of points to the cluster. In our case, this g is equal to the cardinality of
input flows matrix for each machine. Thus, the value of the cluster number, Ck,
would be dynamic based on the length of the input flows matrix. Since the number
of clusters, Ck, has to be an integer value, a ceiling operation has been done
significantly over the rule of thumb.
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Figure 4.2

MINOS extraction of Hourly-based Features for one host.

We now aim to define a set of features that summarize the behavior of a
particular host for each hour. Let us introduce some elements: the clusters
{C1, . . . , Ck} and a flow Flowj = (tj, Gj) (with j = 1, . . . , g).
• tj ∈ houri if the Flowj starts in the hour i;

• Flowj ∈ Ci if the Flowj belongs to cluster Ci;

• D(Gj, Ci) the euclidean distance between the vector of the flow
features Gj representing Flowj and the mean of the cluster Ci.

The hourly-based features consist of a set of features corresponding to the
different clusters, for each hour houri of host hi (Figure 4.2). First, given an hour
houri, MINOS extracts three features for each cluster Cl defined as follows:
1. The number of flows of host hi starting in houri and belonging to cluster
Cl, i.e. |{Flowj|j ∈ {1, . . . , g}, tj ∈ houri, Flowj ∈ Cl}|.

2. The summation of the Euclidean distances of all the flows of host hi
starting in houri and belonging to cluster Cl, i.e.
∑j∈{1,...,g},tj∈houri,Flowj∈Cl D(Gj, Cl).

3. The maximum Euclidean distance among all the flows of host hi
starting in houri and belonging to cluster Cl, i.e.
maxj∈{1,...,g},tj∈houri,Flowj∈Cl D(Gj, Cl).
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The last two features capture how anomalous are the traffic flows
belonging to cluster Cl in the hour houri according to two different aggregations
(i.e., θmax and θavg see section 4.4). Besides, we define two other features as
follows:
1. The summation for each flows Flowj starting in houri of the minimum
euclidean distances D(Gj, Cl) for each cluster Cl, i.e.
∑j∈{1,...,g},tj∈houri minl∈{1,...,k} D(Gj, Cl)

2. The maximum for each flows Flowj of host hi starting in houri of the
minimum Euclidean distances D(Gj, Cl) for each cluster Cl, i.e.
maxj∈{1,...,g},tj∈houri minl∈{1,...,k} D(Gj, Cl)

We introduce these two additional features as anomaly indicators that are
computed while considering all the clusters together. In summary, the total
number of hourly-based features (Figure 4.2) is 3 ∗ k + 2 for each hour houri of
host hi. There are 3 features per k cluster. Also, two additional features exist,

considering all the clusters together. As the last step, once the hourly feature
matrix is obtained, we perform standardization of each feature, so that the
elements have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
Feature Extraction Algorithm. We describe our feature extraction
procedure in the Algorithm 1 that takes two inputs to produce the list for feature
vector (hourdN). Hence, N represents the selected machines (1,000 in number). The
input parameters are FlowjN and d. The FlowjN represents the input flows matrix of
all machines, and d represents the total hours in the given time frame. Since there
are a total 8, 784 hours in the selected year the value of d should be 8, 784.
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Algorithm 1 Feature Vector Extraction
1: Input
2:
FlowjN Flows matrices of all machines
3:
d
The calculative hours into given time period
4: Output
5:
hourdN Feature vectors for all machines
6: procedure FVE(FlowjN, d)
7:
hourdN ← ∅
8:
for i ← 1 to N do
9:
k
The number of clusters
10:
mlModel ← ModelFitting(k, Flowij)
11:
hourdi ← ScoreTransform(Flowij, mlModel)
12:
hourdN ← hourdN ∪ hourdi
13:
end for
14: return hourdN .
The list of feature matrix for all machines
15: end procedure
16: function MODELFITTING(k, Flowij)
17:
mlModel ← KMeansFitting(k, Flowij)
18:
return mlModel
The fitted Kmeans model
19: end function
20: function SCORETRANSFORM(Flowij, mlModel)
21:
for p ← 1 to d do
22:
lm, sm ← ∅
23:
lb ← mlModel.Predict(Flowip)
24:
lb ← processed(lb)
25:
tm ← mlModel.Transform(Flowip)
26:
tm ← processed(tm)
27:
sf1 ← [max(∃k∀Flowip ∈ tm)]
28:
sf2 ← [∑(∃k∀Flowip ∈ tm)]
29:
ls ← [max((∃Flowip∀k) ∈ tm)]
30:
sf3 ← max(ls)
31:
sf4 ← ∑(ls)
32:
sm ← lb ∪ sf1 ∪ sf2 ∪ sf3 ∪ sf4
33:
l m ← l m ∪ sm
34:
end for
35:
return lm
The feature matrix of a single machine
36: end function
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The feature extraction procedure has the following two steps. Firstly, train a
machine learning model for input dataset. Secondly, prepare a meaningful feature
matrix after transforming the score of that model so it can be a high learning point
for the anomaly detection algorithm in the future.
For the first step, the algorithm called "ModelFitting" function, which is
utilized to fit the K − means model using the k and Flowij parameters. The returns
from the mentioned function declare the object of a trained k − means model,
"mlModel". While the model becomes ready, the next target is to construct a
feature vector from the created model.
The ScoreTransform function starts with a for loop running from 1 to d,
where each iteration represents an hour, a row of the feature matrix for the ith
machine. Afterward, the trained model (mlModel) predicts the number of clusters.
The following matrix draws a sample structure of the predicted matrix

(lb) with a dimension of 1 × G, where each column represents the number of a
cluster for a unique flow.

[

lb = Ck C1

C1

C3

C2

C3

C2

C3 … C5

]

Our objective is to extract some meaningful features such that the novelty
detection algorithm can learn as much as possible to produce the desired score.
Thus, we modified the predicted matrix depending on the total number of flows
into each cluster. Therefore, the matrix can identify a normal (highest number of
flows belonging to a cluster) and an abnormal (lowest number of flows belonging
to a cluster) cluster. Generally, the distinguishing between normal and abnormal
flows cluster can be a potential learning foundation for the anomaly detection
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algorithm. The following vector lb with a dimension of 1 × k, represents our
processed matrix of lb.

[

lb = 2

2

3

0

1

0

0

0

…

Since there is a total of k clusters, we can represent the feature vector of lb in
the following way:

lb
In the next step, our algorithm generates a transform matrix (tm) by
transforming the flows of the current hour using the trained mlModel. The
transform property used to return a cluster distance such that in the new space,
each dimension represents the distance to the cluster centers. Therefore, after the
transformation of each flow, we obtain a distance-vector with the cardinality
|Ck|. The following matrix (tm) illustrates the outlook of the transform matrix,
where D denotes the distance to the cluster center. For example, D(2, 3) describes
itself as the distance of the second flow from the center of the third cluster.
D(1, 1) D(1, 2) D(1, 3) ··· D(1, k)
D(2,1) D(2, 2) D(2, 3) ··· D(2, k)

…

…

…

…

tm =

D(g, 1) D(g, 2) D(g, 3) ··· D(g, k)
We processed the above transform matrix tm such that it keeps a record of
the minimum distance of each flow rather than the whole distance. Logically, if
cluster Ck contains flow 1, then the minimum distance from flow 1 to any cluster’s

1

]
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centroid would be the distance from Ck to flow 1. In this case, we define zero for
other clusters except the Ck, which constructs the following matrix tm:

C1
0
D(2,1)
D(3,1)

C2
0
0
0

C3
0
0
0

…

…

0

0

Ck
D(1,2)
0
0

…

0

…

…

0

…
…
…
…

Afterward, we compute a maximum and summation of all distances per
cluster in the tm matrix to define the depth of the anomaly.

fpk+1 = max(0, D(2, 1), D(3, 1), . . . , 0) fp2k+1 = sum(0, D(2, 1), D(3, 1), . . . , 0)
fp2k+2 = sum(0, 0, 0, . . . , 0)

fpk+2 = max(0, 0, 0, . . . , 0)

…
fpk+k = max(D(1, g), 0, 0, . . . , 0)

fp2k+k = sum(D(1, g), 0, 0, . . . , 0)

These maximum and summation values are the primary materials for
producing sub-feature vector sf1 and sf2 with a dimension of 1 × k, mentioned in
line number 27 and 28 in the Algorithm 1.

sf

fpk+1 fpk

sf
Our next step is to create a list of minimum distances per flow for all clusters
from the matrix tm. The following equations are the mathematical representation of
this task, where minF1 expresses the minimum distance from the first flow to all
clusters in tm matrix.
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minF1 = max(0, 0, . . . , D(1, k))
minF2 = max(D(2, 1), 0, . . . , 0)
…
minFg = max(0, 0, . . . , 0)
Line number 29 in Algorithm 1 is exploring itself as a sequence of those
minimum values which we computed above (minF1, . . . , minFg).
ls = [minF1, minF2, . . . , minFg]
We create two sub-features (sf1 and sf2) out of four. The next target is to build
the rest of the sub-features (sf3, sf4) to create a feature matrix for a specific
window. The complexity of sf3 and sf4 are not as similar as sf1 and sf2.They are just
the calculation of maximum and summation of the list (ls), which the algorithm
produced in line number 30 and 31. The following two equations are the formal
presentation of these sub-features:
sf3 = max(ls)
n
sf4 = ∑(ls[i])
i=1

We use the prediction label matrix (lb) and all sub-features (sf1, sf2, sf3, and
sf4) to form a sample (sm) of feature vector. The dimension of this sample is (sm) is
1 × m. Algorithm 1 produces d number of samples (sm). Line number 33 in
Algorithm 1 horizontally merges each of the samples to build the large matrix (lm).
At the end, the function ScoreTransform returns lm as the final feature vector.
Hence, the dimension of this final feature vector would be d × m. The following
matrix illustrates the final feature vector of a single machine:
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f11 … f1k f1k+1 … f1k+k f12k+1 … f12k+k f13k+1 f13k+2
f21 … f2k f2k+1 … f2k+k f22k+1 … f22k+k f23k+1 f23k+2
…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

fd1 … fdk fdk+1 … fdk+k fd2k+1

… fd2k+k fd3k+1 fd3k+2

However, the above matrix stands only for a single machine. As we are
considering 1000 machines, the algorithm generates a list of 1000 feature vectors.
Line number 13 of the algorithm constructs this final matrix by aggregating all the
single machines feature vector.
In summary, we described in this section how we created a well-defined
feature vector. In the next part, we will articulate the application procedure of the
novelty detection algorithm over this feature vector.
4.2

Step 3: Hourly-based Anomaly Detection Model

We use anomaly detection techniques to identify non-conforming hours
inside the time frame of a host. An anomaly detection technique learns the normal
hourly behavior of the host and gives to each hour an anomaly detection score.
The higher the anomaly score for houri, the higher the likelihood that houri is
anomalous. MINOS creates an anomaly detection model, and the output of that
model is a vector of anomaly scores, one anomaly score for each hour of the time
frame. For the anomaly detection model, we considered the Gaussian Mixture
Model (GMM), One-Class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM), Autoencoder,
and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Autoencoder.
Gaussian Mixture Model is an advanced clustering technique that works
by learning a mixture of multivariate Gaussian distributions where each
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distribution represents a specific cluster. Once trained, it assigns to each point a
probability that the mixture distribution generates the points. The anomaly score
for this technique is obtained, not by the learned Gaussian Mixture distribution,
but by computing this probability.
One-Class Support Vector Machine [38] is a classification algorithm
based on the binary support vector machine with the peculiarity to use only one
class in the training phase. The binary classification is obtained by analyzing the
sign of the decision function: if positive, the class is the same as the example used
in training, and if negative, the class is different. The anomaly score is obtained by
inverting the sign of the decision function.
Autoencoder is very similar to a feed-forward multilayer perceptron
neural network. The encoder part aims to learn an encoded representation
(embeddings) of training in different feature space data by efficiently reducing the
dimensionality of the original data space. The decoder phase tries to reconstruct
the original data by taking the embeddings (compressed feature vectors) as input.
For our feature vector, we encoded and decoded twice. The output of an
autoencoder has the same number of computational units as the input (original
feature dimension). An autoencoder reconstructs hourly-based features that have
similar statistical properties in the original feature space. Smaller reconstruction
errors represent the normal and higher reconstruction errors represents the
anomalous hourly-based features.
LSTM Autoencoder [4] is an autoencoder where the input and output are
the sequences of hourly-based features. We considered input sequences of
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consecutive 24 hours and created a dataset of sequences obtained by shifting each
sequence by one hour.
< hourl = [f11, . . . , f1m], . . . , hour24 = [f241 , . . . , f
< hour2 = [f21, . . . , f2m], . . . , hour25 = [f251 , . . . , f

< hourd

, . . . , fdm−24], . . . , hourd = [fd1, . . . , fdm] >

The LSTM Autoencoder reconstructs each sequence and assigns to each
sequence a reconstruction error. The dataset has d − 24 sequences, which produces
d − 24 anomaly scores.
4.3

Step 4: Anomaly Scores Normalization and Aggregation

The LSTM Autoencoder reconstructs each sequence and assigns to each
sequence a reconstruction error. The dataset has d − 24 sequences, which produces
d − 24 anomaly scores.
4.4

Step 4: Anomaly Scores Normalization and Aggregation

To obtain a single score for each host, we use the following two
aggregation procedures:
• Max Aggregation (θmax): Standardizing the score vector (with mean 0 and

standard deviation 1), and then computing the maximum of the normalized
anomaly scores among all the hours of host hi.

• Avg Aggregation (θavg): Scaling the score vector by dividing each

component by the maximum absolute value, and then computing the
average of all the scaled anomaly scores among all the hours of host hi.

The θmax and θavg represents the worst and average anomalous scenario,
respectively, for each host. We compute the scores of each host individually and
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compare them with the normalization operations (the standardization and the
scaling operation).
The maximum absolute scaling and standardization (i.e., the two
normalization procedures) are not interchangeable in the θmax and θavg, because the
average of different standardized data would always correspond to the same value
and the maximum absolute value of different scaled data may always correspond
to value 1.
4.5

Step 5: Unsupervised Classification

The detection module group obtained anomaly scores for all hosts by using
K-Means (number of clusters k=3). It assigns all the hosts inside a cluster to a
class among CH, HUA, and MH. The centroid with the lowest value is assigned to
the class of clean hosts (CH), the one with the highest value is assigned to the
class of malicious hosts (MH), and the centroid with the middle value is assigned
to the class of hosts under attack (HUA).
4.6

Step 6: Anomalous or Not Anomalous Identification

After standardizing the score vector of all hosts, the detection module
identifies each hour of the host as either Anomalous or Not Anomalous. If the
score of a particular hour is higher (positive), that hour is classified as the
anomalous time frame. On the other hand, if the score of a particular hour is lower
(negative), that hour is identified as the not anomalous time frame.
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this chapter, we evaluate the capability of MINOS to prioritize hosts
among CH, HUA, and MH based on anomaly scores. Afterward, we measure the
accuracy and required execution times at different time frames followed by
unsupervised classifications of each host as either CH, HUA, and MH. Finally, we
identify precisely when any particular attack or list of the attacks has happened for
HUA and MH hosts.
We also compare our research outcomes concerning MINOS with Kitsune’s [41],
state of the art approach. As discussed in Section 2.7, Kitsune was originally designed
to analyze packets data of IoT traffic for a few hours. However, there are two main
reasons this method is not valid in large networks. First, it is infeasible to analyze the
packet level information for a given period (i.e., a couple of months / a year/ more).
Second, it is insufficient to create a behavioral model for complicated activities and
large patterns [2, 39] of client/server hosts. Hence, we reimplement the same
architecture and methodology of Kitsune (based on an ensemble of Autoencoders),
but we apply it on our hourlybased features (cf. Section 4.1).

Figure 5.1

Hosts sorted by increasing OC-SVM anomaly score value.
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Figure 5.2
5.1

Hosts sorted by increasing Autoencoder anomaly score value.

Separating CH, HUA, and MH with Hourly-based Anomaly Scores
We first evaluate the capability of the anomaly scores to separate the hosts

within the three categories (CH, HUA, and MH). Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 report three
bar charts (for OC-SVM, Autoencoder and Kitsune) with the θavg anomaly scores
on the time frame of one year. The hosts are ordered over the X-axis according to
the anomaly scores produced by MINOS. Each vertical bar represents a specific
host, and the color represents the ground truth of one of three classes among CH,
HUA, and MH. Figure 5.1 shows that the anomaly score mostly orders first the
clean hosts (CH), second the hosts under attack (HUA) and last the malicious
hosts (MH). In other words, malicious hosts have the

Figure 5.3

Hosts sorted by increasing Kitsune anomaly score value.

highest anomaly scores. This figure intuitively explains how MINOS can
effectively prioritize the riskiest and most dangerous hosts in the network. We can
observe that OC-SVM offers the best separation of the three classes.
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To better quantify the discriminatory powers of the MINOS anomaly scores
we consider two binary classification problems: (i) CH vs. Other (i.e., CH vs.
HUA and MH), and then (ii) HUA vs. MH. In particular, in the case of CH vs.
Other, we test the hypothesis that higher anomaly scores correspond to a higher
likelihood that the host is under attack or malicious. In the case of HUA vs. MH,
we test the hypothesis that higher anomaly scores correspond to the higher
likelihood of a host being malicious. To test these hypotheses, we use the Area
Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUROC) and the Average
Precision (AP).
Table 5.1 reports the results for the different anomaly scores obtained over
a period of 12 months with the different anomaly models and two different
aggregation procedures (θmax and θavg). Table 5.1 shows that the OC-SVM with the
θavg aggregation in the MINOS anomaly detection approach satisfies all the
hypotheses. After the OC-SVM, the Autoencoder works perfectly for the case CH
vs. Other, but not for HUA vs. MH. MINOS (OC-SVM) also outperforms
Kitsune, especially in terms of AP, and in the case of HUA vs. MH (Figures 5.1,
5.2 and 5.3).
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Table 5.1
AUROC and AP of anomaly scores on 12 months of traffic. Values
≥ 0.80 are highlighted in bold.
CH vs. Other
AUROC
Algorithm/Aggregation

θmax

θavg

MINOS (GM M)

0.95

0.05

MINOS (OC-SVM)

0.20

MINOS (Autoencoder)

HUA vs. MH

AP

AP

θavg

θmax

θavg

θmax

θavg

0.97

0.31

0.04

0.39

0.07

0.18

1.00

0.37

1.00

0.81

0.90

0.55

0.71

1.00

0.92

0.99

0.93

0.30

0.72

0.12

0.29

MINOS (LSTM)

0.82

0.18

0.75

0.32

0.85

0.13

0.38

0.04

Kitsune [41]

0.99

0.12

0.99

0.31

0.29

0.69

0.13

0.30

5.2

θmax

AUROC

Attack Time Identification

We described the ground truth collection per hour for each machine in
chapter 4. In this section, we explain our results of recognizing when an attack has
happened for HUA and MH by graphical representation. For attack time
identification we use both HUA and MH to compare hourly based experimental
anomaly detection score with the ground truth and then produce the accuracy
score of AUROC and AP.
Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 represent the accuracy of AUROC and AP
against the experimental result of LSTM − Autoencoder and OC − SVM for HUA
and MH, respectively. The horizontal line indicates all machines, and the vertical
line implies the accuracy score. The red and blue line indicates the accuracy of AP
and AUROC, respectively.
Table 5.3 shows that, among all the experiments, the best accuracy for host
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Figure 5.4

The LSTM accuracy of attack time for the HUA

Figure 5.5

The LSTM accuracy of attack time for the MM

identification was achieved by the OC − SVM. For the attack time
identification, we found that, among all of them, LSTM-Autoencoder and OCSVM performed the best. Figure 5.4 represents the accuracy for HUA, where the
accuracy of AP reached up to 100%, and the efficiency of AUROC fluctuated
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Figure 5.6

The OC-SVM accuracy of attack time for the HUA

Figure 5.7

The OC-SVM accuracy of attack time for the MH

between 60% to 80%. In some cases, even AUROC fell sharply; because
some machines are carrying a few attacks in most of the sequences. Since our
LSTM
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Figure 5.8

AUROC and AP of GMM for different time frames.

anomaly detection algorithm used 24 hour sequences to train the model,
we aggregated 24 hour ground truth each time for the LSTM − Autoencoder.
Therefore, for some machines, there exist a few attacks for most of the sequences,
which creates minimal accuracy for the AUROC. On the other hand, figure 5.5
depicts that there is not available AUROC accuracy for a few machines, because
those machines contained at least one attack for all of the sequences. Thus,
AUROC produced "nan" value instead of any accuracy.
5.3

Different Time Frames

We investigate the impact of time frame size on the accuracy of the
MINOS anomaly scores. Figures 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 report MINOS scores for
all the anomaly detection models (y-axis), corresponding to 0.5, 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12
months of time frame (x-axis). These plots show that OC-SVM with the θavg
aggregation is the best anomaly detection model, even when the analysis dataset
size is only one month, in which AUROC is higher than 0.8 for both separation
problems (i.e., CH vs. Other and HUA vs. MH).
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Figure 5.9

Figure 5.10

AUROC and AP of OC-SVM for different time frames.

AUROC and AP of Autoencoder for different time frames.
5.4

Execution Time

Since the dataset is massive, Titan has been used to run the proposed
approaches. Titan is a supercomputer that uses Graphics Processing Units (GPUs)
including conventional Central Processing Units (CPUs). Titan’s performance is
measured in floating-point operations per second (FLOPS) instead of million
instructions per second (MIPS). Titan is the first such hybrid to perform over ten
petaFLOPS.
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Figure 5.11

Table 5.2

AUROC and AP of LSTM for different time frames.

Execution time (in minutes) for 1,000 machines.

Algorithm

2

1

3 Months 6 Months 9 Months 12 Months

Weeks

Month

MINOS (GMM)

2.59

6.70

213.90

410.35

945.49

2568.88

MINOS (OC-

1.58

3.71

107.02

245.76

402.62

597.63

66.88

77.82

226.86

627.48

943.98

1663.88

178.56 392.14

1208.99

2949.78

4386.78

6498.38

69.12

234.78

652.14

970.87

1728.14

SVM)
MINOS
(Autoencoder)
MINOS
(LSTM)
Kitsune [41]

80.86

In our experiments, we used a server with two 2.10 GHz Xeon E4-2620
Processors, 128GB RAM, and 4 Titan X GPUs. The system ran Ubuntu 16.4 with
scikit-learn, Keras and ThunderSVM libraries. In particular, Keras and
ThunderSVM libraries can use Titan X GPU to speed up the computational time

72
(inference and test) for GMM, Autoencoder, LSTM, and One-Class Support
Vector Machine (OC-SVM).
Table 5.2 reports the total execution times (in minutes) to analyze 1,000 hosts
with MINOS and Kitsune, where MINOS (OC-SVM) is fastest, followed by
Autoencoder. Also, Kitsune has higher execution time with lower detection
performance.

Table 5.3

Performance of 3-class detection module (12 months).
θmax

θavg

Algorithm

Metric

Prec.

Rec.

F1

Prec.

Rec.

F1

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.44

0.44

0.44

MINOS (GMM)

Micro
Macro

0.09

0.04

0.01

0.33

0.35

0.24

Weighted

0.14

0.01

0.01

0.32

0.44

0.28

Micro
Macro

0.54

0.54

0.54

0.98

0.98

0.98

0.54

0.36

0.29

0.92

0.90

0.91

Weighted

0.48

0.54

0.40

0.98

0.98

0.98

Micro
Macro

0.88

0.88

0.88

0.81

0.81

0.81

0.66

0.65

0.64

0.65

0.58

0.60

Weighted

0.92

0.88

0.90

0.82

0.81

0.79

Micro
Macro

0.69
0.57

0.69
0.61

0.69
0.57

0.30
0.26

0.30
0.47

0.30
0.26

Weighted

0.70

0.69

0.68

0.35

0.30

0.31

Micro
Macro

0.09

0.09

0.09

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.32

0.16

0.11

0.14

0.18

0.14

Weighted

0.41

0.09

0.13

0.18

0.16

0.17

MINOS (OC-SVM)

MINOS (Autoencoder)

MINOS (LSTM)

Kitsune [41]
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5.5

Unsupervised Classification Performance

Table 5.3 reports the performance results (Precision, Recall, F1-Score)
when using the fully unsupervised classification module of MINOS described in
Section 4.5. Since there are three classes (CH, HUA, MH), we report Micro,
Macro, and Weighted statistics. These results confirm that MINOS with OC-SVM
and θavg aggregation achieves the best performance. We remark that no training
labels have been used by MINOS to achieve this performance. The lower Macro
performance in OC-SVM is related to some malicious hosts classified as under
attack and vice versa, while the separation between CH and the others (HUA and
MH) remains very nitid. Conversely, Kitsune [41] performs poorly because there
is not a clear separation between the anomaly scores it generates (cf. Figure
5.1,5.2, and 5.3).
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
6.1

Summary

We have proposed MINOS, a fully unsupervised method for traffic
anomaly detection, which does not require any ground truth or label data. It can
perform offline analysis for large networks efficiently. Moreover, it can prioritize
and classify internal hosts in three categories: clean hosts, hosts under attack, and
malicious hosts. Also, it can identify the time frame of an attack for malicious and
under attack machines. MINOS with OC-SVM and θavg aggregation method
performs better than state of the art, both in terms of accuracy and execution time.
We remark that MINOS can parallelize each host separately and analyze
large time frames of traffic in a short time. The low execution times suggest that
future work can effectively adapt MINOS for online analysis.
The proposed methodology is obtaining high accuracy by analyzing normal
traffic, where the status of a machine is entirely unknown. In this context, Chapter
6. Conclusion
the low false alarms (false positive rates) of this unsupervised novelty
detection score can be a practical solution to the problem, which is consistent with
safety and security. Also, our work proves that only two weeks of traffic flows are
sufficient to obtain the desired result in a year. As a result, it reduces the execution
time and acts as a less resource-intensive task.
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6.2

Future Work

We used Gaussian Mixture Model, One-Class Support Vector Machine,
Autoencoder, and LSTM-Autoencoder methodologies for our Anomaly detection
models. We believe that there is a space for more improvement in terms of
differentiating malicious machines and machines under attack. Moreover, an
hourly-based feature extraction procedure needs two days for 1000 machines to
create a feature vector. We can improve the execution time of this procedure.
Furthermore, instead of only offline analysis, we can think about online analysis.
We need to enhance the accuracy of the attack time identification for a machine.
Additionally, we are identifying the host and time of the attack in an unsupervised
manner in this research, which could open up the possibility of also defining a
type of priority of the attack in an unsupervised way.
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